This edited volume examines how political violence and coercion are central to state capture.

Departing from accounts that largely emphasize economic influence, corruption, and institutional weakness, this volume demonstrates how armed force, intimidation, and repression can be decisive in enabling elites and armed actors to control state institutions. The book examines how, across different political and institutional settings, political and economic elites can work in alliance with armed actors—including militias, paramilitaries, and organized crime networks—to shape policy, extract resources, and undermine accountability. Through comparative case studies spanning the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and southern Europe, the chapters show how, in fragile and vulnerable states, violence and corruption can become embedded in everyday governance. By systematically integrating political violence into the study of state capture, the book offers a timely framework that bridges political economy, security studies, and state-building debates.

This book will be of great interest to students of political violence, corruption, state fragility, governance in contested spaces, and International Relations.