There is a fundamental paradox in counter-terrorism: while Muslim state elites insist that Islam has nothing to do with terrorism, the way Muslim states deal with terrorism has everything to do with Islam. In countries like Morocco and Tunisia, terrorism is treated by governments as if it is a religious problem. Elsewhere, in Malaysia, Islamic actors are relied upon to conduct "deradicalization" programs, Islamic institutions are the key authors of counter-radicalization materials, and Islamic expertise is often considered interchangeable with counter-terror expertise. These findings draw attention to a security logic whereby Islam and Islamic interventions became central to solving the problem of terrorism. In this theoretically innovative and empirically rich book, Chan argues that Malaysia's "Islamized" counter-terrorism is an outcome filtered through a matrix of factors, including postcolonial elite status-seeking, modernist state-building, and the immediacies of governmental problem-solving. Drawing from historical as well as contemporary data, including interviews and discourse analysis of firsthand materials, Chan centers the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on Malaysia's experience and fills a void in the Western-centric GWOT literature that often fails to examine the social dynamics of the GWOT in Muslim-majority settings and its practical implications. This book's original findings will interest scholars and students of security, international relations, area studies, and Muslim politics.