Operation Blue And Combat In The Caucuses: How Germany Lost On The Eastern Front

Nazi Germany's role in the Second World War has generated interest since the war's end, and for good reason. At any given time between 1939 and 1945 as much as half the planet's population was trying to kill each other (or producing the means to do so). Over 60 million people died. More than half these deaths occurred in Eastern Europe - including an estimated 27 million in the Soviet Union alone. This is also where over 18 million Germans and several million more Finnish, Hungarian, Romanian, and other Axis soldiers faced off against nearly 35 million Soviet men and women in history's greatest land war. The centre of gravity in this immense struggle occurred within the Ukraine and Southern Russia during the summer of 1942. That fighting still draws attention from military history enthusiasts, as well as historians and defence practitioners alike. The 2022 Russian invasion of the Ukraine renewed combat in locations familiar to those fascinated by the Second World War. Today's battles further fuels debate as to how it was so many years ago that the Red Army prevailed over Nazi Germany's armed forces (Wehrmacht). It thus befits us to understand exactly how that prior war unfolded as it did. That's because in spite of the Nazi-Soviet war's massive numbers, more often than not the outcome hung on a thread. This second volume of How Germany Lost offers the reader a unique approach to understanding how and why the Second World War ended as it did, doing so by applying long-standing rules of successfully waging war to the specific facts and circumstances of Germany's 1942 campaign in the Ukraine and Southern Russia (Operation Blue). Although taking a fresh perspective on the War, this book is not a counterfactual exercise, nor is it an alternative history of WWII. Volume II builds upon Volume I in this series to provide a side-by-side analysis of historical events in the Ukraine and Southern Russia during 1942 juxtaposed against those unfolding elsewhere in Europe and the Mediterranean. As Volume II will show, Germany didn't lose the war because it was buried under a sea of enemy men and war material. It possessed the resources needed to secure victory in Europe, but blew the chance anyway because of its own mistakes. All the major powers to fight in the Second World War made, at times, egregious errors. Such is the nature of warfare. As we shall see here however, during the summer and fall of 1942 Germany's reached a level of incompetence unlike any other. In spite of that, Germany still had multiple opportunities to right its war effort. Nevertheless, during 1942's Operation Blue, and even as initial operational success produced strategic opportunity, German mistakes kept coming. AUTHOR: Steven D. Mercatante is the author of Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe (Praeger). Widely acclaimed by notable military historians from the world over, Why Germany Nearly Won has remained in print for well over a decade, and in multiple editions. He is also the founder and editor in chief of The Globe at War, a website focused on exploring World War II that has further established the author as a respected authority on the subject. He is also a corporate tax attorney, and is the founder and principal of TIR Consulting LLC; a consulting firm specializing in international, federal, state and local tax compliance. He has been extensively published in the field of Tax Law, and is a well-known speaker and educa-tor in that field. Mercatante received his BA from the University of Michigan, a teaching certifi-cate in history and political science from Eastern Michigan University, and a JD from Michigan State University College of Law, graduating with a concentration in international law. He is a member of the State Bar of Michigan. 15 b/w illustrations