This book analyzes the financial policies and institutions developed under the Franco regime over nearly four decades and how key actors – banks, savings banks, the foreign sector, the Bank of Spain, and public debt management – were used to support the regime’s economic objectives.

Situating Francoist financial policy within the broader European context of post–World War II financial repression, it highlights the distinctive features of the Spanish case, shaped by a political dictatorship that profoundly influenced both policy design and institutional practice. By combining institutional analysis with the study of regulation, financial mechanisms, and historical evolution, the book offers a nuanced account of the financial history of Francoism and places Spain within broader postwar European patterns of financial interventionism.

Offering new empirical evidence, critical interpretations, and comparative perspectives, this volume targets a broad academic audience including undergraduates seeking an introduction to the Franco regime’s financial system, postgraduate and PhD students requiring in-depth analysis for advanced research in economic history, as well as researchers and scholars interested in transnational approaches to economic policy and institutional development.